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ABSTRACT 
An Examination of Death Saltence: A Coµiponent . 
in the Death Anxiety Model 
by 
Rachel A. Mason 
Master of Arts, Graduate Program in Psychology 
Loma Linda University, December 2002 
Dr. Kelly R. Morton, Chairperson 
Reviews of the literature have identified few consistent !heoretical approaches in 
the assessment of death anxiety and death attitudes for patients diagnosed with a 
potentially life threatening illness, such as cancer. This illness experience forces patients 
to contemplate their mortality. The present study employed a portion of the Death 
Anxiety Model to examine the relationships between death salience, beliefs about the 
self, beliefs about the world, death meaning, and death anxiety. Three groups (N = 121) 
who differed on death salience were examined: cancer survivors (intrapersonal - high 
salience), spouses of cancer survivors (interpersonal - moderate salience), and healthy 
patients with no previous exposure to a life threatening illness or cancer (no personal -
low salience). It was hypothesized that 1) the salience groups would differ on death 
anxiety and death meaning, 2) positive death meaning would be negatively correlated 
with death anxiety, and 3) death salience group membership would be predicted by 
beliefs about the self, beliefs about the world, death meaning, and death anxiety. · Results 
showed that the salience groups differed on existential well-being, death meaning (fear 
and avoidance) and death anxiety. Healthy patients were more avoidant of death than 
either the cancers survivors or the spouses. However, Spouses of cancer survivors 
viewed death with more fear than the Healthy group and the cancer survivors themselves. 
viii 
Death salience group membership was correctly classified for 70.3% of patients as 
predicted by length of time married, causal attributions — external and personal control, 
belief in a just world, Existential well-being, death fear, death avoidance, neutral 
acceptance, approach acceptance, escape acceptance, and death anxiety. These results 
indicate that the experience of a life threatening disease such as cancer has a profound 
influence on the meaning of death, for both patients and the patient's spouse. 
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Introduction 
The last four decades have shown increased research in the area of death and 
dying. Since Feifel's work in the 1950s and 1960s there have been over 1000 published 
articles examining death related concepts (Neimeyer, 1997-98). These empirical works 
demonstrate systematic differences in the definition of the construct of death anxiety; 
consequently, differing operational definitions have been used in accordance with each 
theoretical orientation. 
Psychoanalytic theories are based on the premise that people are driven by 
biological needs and when these needs are unfulfilled, psychological tensions (anxiety) 
arise. The organism is constantly striving to maintain homeostasis by fulfilling biological 
needs, thus decreasing anxiety. Therefore, it is postulated that homeostasis motivates 
behavior and pleasure is the by-product of being in a state of equilibrium (Feshbach, 
Weiner, & Bohart, 1996). While seemingly contrary to this state of equilibrium, 
psychoanalytic theory incorporates a death instinct, which is conceptualized as a state in 
which there are no unsatisfied desires or needs; thus, the absence of unsatisfied desires 
results in homeostasis. However, while death may produce a homeostatic state, the ego 
experiences anxiety because death signals the destruction of the ego. Though there is 
agreement on the foundational premises, there has been little agreement about how to 
conceptualize and assess the anxiety produced when the ego is confronted with death. 
For example, in a study examining the relation between death anxiety, religion, 
guilt, and separation-individuation, Swanson and Byrd (1998) defined death anxiety as "a 
ubiquitous, nonpathological state that is triggered by a strong sense of personal identity" 
(p. 259). This definition of death anxiety was founded in an integrated psychoanalytic 
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and existential perspective, such that the most feared aspect of death is the dissolution of 
the self. Additionally; Arndt, Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1998) 
working from Terror-Management th�ory, examined the impact of self-awareness on 
death anxiety. In this study, death anxiety was measured as the subject's avoidance of a 
mirror, which was postulated as a prompt for self-awareness, while taking a survey of 
death attitudes. Subsequently, the subjects' level of death anxiety was assessed by the 
degree of avoiding self-awareness (the mirror) when death was personally salient (the 
survey). Other studies, such as Arndt et al. (1998), address another difficulty in defining 
death anxiety; specifically, whether death anxiety can be assessed at a conscious level. 
Questions concerning the viability of conscious death anxiety research have not been 
unanimously resolved; however, the majority of research has supported the use of 
conscious' level reports of death anxiety (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Scheier, Carver, & 
Gibbons, 1981). While there are a multitude of definitions for death anxiety that are used 
in psychoanalytic research, the core premise is consistent with the existential crisis of 
duality, or as stated in the psychoanalytic literature, death anxiety is the conscious 
awareness of death as a state of homeostasis. 
Existentialist theories are founded on the premise that it is one's subjective 
experience, or the meaning that one places on events that is of importance. The primary 
concern in existential theory is with the cognitive aspects of experience. Thus, according 
to existentialist theory, it is the human capacity for self-reflection and unique perception 
that affects one's fate, and determines the responsibility for events that occur in one's life 
(Feshbach, Weiner, & Bohart, 1996). Several of the existential theories, such as theories 
of self-realization, search-for-meaning theories, personal construct theory, self-
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discrepancy theory, and Erickson's psychosocial development theory have been 
employed in studies that examine death anxiety (Tomer, 1992). A common conceptual 
thread is identified from studies that employ either psychoanalytic or existential 
worldviews: the existential crisis of duality. 
The existential crisis of duality stems from the dilemma to reconcile our animal or 
base mortality with our symbolic identity (Firestone, 1993; Swanson & Byrd, 1998). 
Humans are able to create a symbolic identity that is greater than the flesh and bone of 
the body; however, there is uncertainty regarding the meaning of physical death to the 
symbolic identity. The inability to reconcile the paradox between life and death, and the 
body to the symbolic identity is the basis of death anxiety (Becker, 1973). Humans know 
death will arrive; "in other words, the final terror of self consciousness [symbolic 
identity] is the knowledge of one's own death, which is the peculiar sentence to man 
alone in the animal kingdom...death is man's peculiar and greatest anxiety" (Becker, 
1973, p. 69-70). Therefore, it is not only the fear of a physical death, but also the 
ambiguity of the finality of the spirit that has led to the current conceptualization of death 
anxiety. Therefore,-death anxiety stems not only from fears about the dying process but 
also from the existential crisis of duality, or the anticipation of a state in which the self 
ceases to exist (Neimeyer & Chapman, 1980-198; Tomer & Eliason, 1996). 
A more fully developed construct of death anxiety has emerged from research 
employing both psychoanalytic and existential orientations; this work identifies the 
existential crisis as the core concept from which to define death anxiety. Death anxiety, 
therefore, is defined as "a cluster of death attitudes characterized by fear, threat, unease, 
discomfort and similar negative emotional reactions, as well as anxiety in the 
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psychodynamic sense as a kind of diffuse fear that has no clear object" (Neimeyer, 1997-
98, p.98). The above definition of death anxiety was employed in the· present 
investigation for two reasons. First, the stability of this definition has been supported by 
the development of numerous psychometrically validated instruments (see Neimeyer, 
1997-98 for a review). Second, the use of this accepted operational definition, founded 
on existential theory, has facilitated continued research from which the mainstay of death 
and dying literature has come (Neimeyer, 1994; Thorson & Powell, 1990; Tomer & 
Eliason, 1996). .
The consistent identification of an existential crisis that results in the experience 
of death. anxiety, as previously defined, supports employin� an existential theory to
further investigate components that'influence death anxiety. The Death Anxiety Model 
(DAM) (Tomer & Eliason, 1996) is founded in existential theory and attempts to identify 
several components that capture the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms of 
death anxiety. 
Death Anxiety Model 
The lack of a comprehensive model or framework from which to systematically 
examine commonalties in death anxiety research has led to inconclusive and 
contradictory findings regarding the effects of age, religiosity, and illness severity on 
death anxiety (Neimeyer, 1994; Richardson & Sands, 1986-87; Thorson & Powell, 1990). 
The Death Anxiety Model (DAM) proposed by Tomer and Eliason (1996) was developed 
in response to the need for a comprehensive and testable model that addresses these 
factors. The primary goal of the DAM is to promote the inclusion of important predictors 
of death anxiety in empirical studies and systematic research designs to examine the 
phenomenon across time and groups. 
Several less comprehensive models were combined (Mikulincer & Florian, 1995; 
Thompson & Janigian, 1988; Wood & Robinson, 1982) in the development of the DAM. 
Mikulincer and Florian (1995), for example, used models of psychosocial development 
and coping to identify the relative importance of developmental stressors for middle-aged 
men facing retirement, aging, and the prospect of death. Several other general 
approaches also influenced the development of the DAM (see Tomer, 1992 for a review). 
These earlier models were incomplete because they only accounted for relations between 
death anxiety and self-actualization (the process of reconciling one's true self with one's 
ideal self), or death anxiety and meaningfulness of death (religious beliefs, beliefs in an 
afterlife, or the physical process of dying, i.e., the contextual characteristics of dying) 
(see Neimeyer, 1994). However, Tomer and Eliason (1996), linked self-actualization, in 
the forms of one's beliefs about the self and the world as well as death meaning with 
several other components suggested by psychoanalytic theory (e.g., regrets related to the 
past and future) into a comprehensive model of death anxiety. It was hoped that this 
model would account for more variance in death anxiety outcomes, specifically regarding 
age, gender, and religiosity (the impact of religiosity will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this review). 
Review of the death anxiety literature has shown that there are age and gender 
differences; however, the nature of these differences is not well understood. Several 
studies have reported that younger people and women typically have higher death anxiety 
(Galt & Hayslip, 1998; Hoelter & Hoelter, 1980-1981; Keller, Sherry, & Piotrowski, 
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1984; Pollak, 1979); however, many of these studies have non-normal participant gender 
and age sample distributions. For example, Cicerelli's (1998) study examining the 
(' 
relation between death ,theaning and death fear/anxiety, demonstrates that women and 
those in their 20"s (M=21.5 years) demonstrate more fear of death (when death is 
identified as extinction) than, those 'in their 30- and 40's (M=36.0 years) who are more 
likely to consider an afterlife and demonstrate less fear of death as extinction. However, 
the study sample was heavily skewed, with 85% of the sample being between age 18 and 
25 and predominately female (83%). Cicerelli acknowledges that these findings may not 
be generalizable, and thus do not contribute significantly to the understanding of the 
age/change question. Similarly, Durlak and Kass (1981) compared 15 measures of fear 
of death and death anxiety in an attempt to differentiate death attitudes. While not all of 
the attitudes identified in this study were predicted by gender, women generally had 
higher scores and reacted more negatively to death. However, this study was limited to 
undergraduate students and the age range was too narrow (mean age =21, mode = 19) to 
be representative of anyone but young adults/late adolescents. Conversely, Keller, 
Sherry, and Piotrowski (1984) examined death anxiety within a comprehensive range of 
ages. Their study utilized six age groups: young adult (18-23; n=336), adult (24-29; 
n=159), early middle age (30-37, n=146), middle age (38-44, n=82), late middle age (45-
59; n=85), and old age (60-87, n=66). Age and gender were compared across three 
factors of death anxiety; 1) death in general (including death of others), 2) belief in a 
hereafter, and 3) death anxiety related to self (including death of self). Results from this 
study provide some insight regarding the reported age and death anxiety inconsistencies; 
specifically, the old age group demonstrated the highest amount of anxiety about death in 
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general, but were least anxious for death anxiety related to self. Additionally, women 
had a stronger beliefin d'hereafter and more anxiety for death of self than men; however, 
no gender differences in anxiety were noted for death in general. The authors suggest 
that the use of death anxiety measures must be sensitive enough to differentiate between 
general fears of death and dying (pain and trauma of physical death) and specific fears 
about the death of one's self (existential crisis). 
Noppe and Noppe (1997) were able to further demonstrate age and gender 
differences in meaning of death and death anxiety. In this study, the authors used three 
age groups (middle school, high school, and college students) to examine the differences 
in meaning of death as it evolves over adolescence. The measure of death anxiety used 
was an open-ended survey, which yielded five themes following content analysis. Three 
of the themes were specifically related to the experience of death-related events, while 
the other two attempted to assess death meaning and death anxiety; however, the death 
• meaning and death anxiety subscales were merged and used to assess the subjects' 
overall concept of death. The authors reported that the oldest subjects (college students) 
and females were more likely to have experienced a death, or death related event (e.g., 
attended a funeral or experienced the loss of a family member), and were also more likely 
to have developed a mature understanding of death. A mature concept of death was 
described as understanding the universality, irreversibility, and body non-functionality of 
dying. Though age and experience may lead to a mature understanding of death, because 
this theme was broadly abstract it could not be used to examine individuals' subjective 
meaning of death; thus, no clear conceptualization between death anxiety and meaning 
was established. While overall research findings suggest that there are age and gender 
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differences in death anxiety, there has been little research that has examined the 
combined effect of one's death meaning and one's death salience on death anxiety; 
therefore, the present study will also examine both age and gender differences. Gender 
and maturational effects will be explored using the DAM, which suggests that death 
anxiety is affected by one's meaning of death, together with other mediating factors such 
as one's beliefs about the self and the world, and death salience. 
The DAM (see Figure 1) can be divided into two components. The top half of the 
model, which includes the relation between death salience, beliefs about one's self and 
the world, and death meaning, examines the interpersonal/relational aspects of death 
anxiety. In other words, this interpersonal/relational pathway of the model examines how 
an individual's experiences with the world interact with personal beliefs, attributions and 
interpretations to culminate in a level of death anxiety. The remaining components of the 
model focus on the intra-personal aspects of death anxiety; for example, one's regrets 
about unfulfilled desires and hopes that one had for one's life. However, these 
components of the DAM were not examined in the present study because these constructs 
are less well defined than the interpersonal/relational constructs. Thus, the 
interpersonal/relational pathway of the DAM was the focus of the present investigation. 
Death Salience' 
Death salience, or how relevant death is to an individual, is the first component of 
the DAM and is hypothesized to directly influence beliefs about the self and the world, as 
well as death meaning. Research focusing on the relationship between death salience 
(i.e., exposure resulting from death education courses or the experience of severe illness) 
and death anxiety demonstrated inconsistent correlations (Cella & Tross, 1987; Hoelter & 
························y' 
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Hoelter, 1980; Knight & Elfenbein, 1993; Maglio & Robinson, 1994; Neimeyer, 1994). 
Indeed, several studies having examined the influence of death education on death 
anxiety have reported contradictory findings. For exa�ple, the literature shows that some 
death education programs demonstrated increased death anxiety after the course 
terminated while for others death anxiety decreased (Davis-Berman, 1998-1999; Hoelter 
& Hoelter, 1980; Knight & Elfenbein, 1993). Davis-Berman (1998) demonstrated that 
post-test scores of death anxiety (fear of death) dramatically decreased in a sample 
(n=56) of undergraduates ( ages ranged from 19-21) after completing a 15-week, lecture 
format course on death and dying. Conversely, Knight and Elfenbein (1993), employed 
an experiential format with a similar population, collecting information regarding the 
meaning attributed to death. Their findings demonstrate that for subjects who ascribe a 
positive meaning to death (tranquil), death anxiety scores decreased, whereas, subjects 
who ascribe a negative meaning to death (fierce) demonstrate increased death anxiety. 
However, the majority of the sample demonstrated increased death anxiety (52%), while 
the remaining sample demonstrated either decreased death anxiety ( 41 % ) or stayed the 
same (7% ). The �ndings from these studies suggest that salience of death, via education 
is more likely to increase death anxiety for individuals that ascribe negative meanings to 
death. Additionally, a meta-analyti� review, of sixty-two studies (Maglio & Robinson, 
1994) reported that education on death and dying typically increased death anxiety. 
These findings, however, have been questioned because of the variability between death 
education programs ( e.g., experiential class exercises and field trips versus traditional 
lecture format) and use of unidimensional measures of death anxiety. Thus, if some types 
of death education alone may increase death anxiety, then it follows that the experience 
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of death anxiety may be further complicated when one is personally exposed to, 
experiences death or a life threatening illness. 
Overall research findings demonstrate that with age there is a greater likelihood 
that one has experienced severe illness or loss of loved ones, thereby making death more 
salient. Additionally, it is suggested that death salience will further influence one's 
beliefs about the self and the world, and initially increase death anxiety (Tomer & 
Eliason, 1996). In other words, the experience of a severe illness at any age forces one to 
evaluate, perhaps prematurely, the course of his or her life. Cella and Tross (1987) 
investigated the salience effect of a life threatening diagnosis on one's level of death 
anxiety. In their study of 60 male cancer survivors, levels of death anxiety did not vary 
by cancer diagnoses (Hodgkin's and Testicular) or prognosis. Specifically, ratings of 
death anxiety were highest immediately after patients had received the diagnosis but 
diminished over time (between 18 months and 5 years since the initial diagnosis), 
regardless of severity of diagnosis and prognosis. These findings suggest that death 
anxiety levels were not dependent on severity of illness, or the probability of death, but 
were influenced more by the immediate personal salience or personal threat of the life 
threatening diagnosis. Additionally, Hoelter and Hoelter (1980) in a larger study 
(N=375) reported that college aged individuals who had been exposed to the death of a 
family member within the last five years expressed higher levels of death anxiety than 
those who had no exposure to death. These studies suggest that the effect of death 
salience on death anxiety varies due to the type of exposure to death: If exposure 
(increased death salience) occurs intrapersonally (to one's self) then anxiety decreases 
over time, as illustrated by the male cancer survivors in the study conducted by Cella and 
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Tross (1987). These findings may have come about because the individual has been 
forced to reconcile what death means to him/herself, and confront the existential crisis. 
Exposure that occurs interpersoi:ially (to others) demonstrates an increase in death anxiety 
with time, as shown by th�. findings of Hoelter and Hoelter (1980). Suggesting that the 
threat of mortality has been posed and is salient; however, it lacks the intrapersonal 
salience to force the individual to confront his/her own beliefs about and meaning of 
death. Experiences with severe personal illness, death, and dying are therefore of critical 
importance in understanding how an individual experiences death anxiety. 
Beliefs about the Self and the World 
The importance of one's perception of control over life events has been 
investigated for several decades (Lefcourt, 1981; Levenson, 1981; Rotter, 1966). Fife 
(1995), examined the influence of perceived personal control on psychological 
adjustment in illness for patients diagnosed with cancer. Personal control was identified 
as being predictive of better psychological adjustment when the meaning that the patient 
attributes to the illness was assessed (e.g., the cancer was a signal to change one's 
lifestyle). Specifically, meaning of illness was defined as the individual's perception of 
how the illness influenced his/her personal existence and whether the world has meaning 
or purpose (Fife, 1995). 
The value of perceiving personal control is specifically addressed in attribution 
theory. Attribution theory was initially put forth by Fritz Heider (1958), and was 
described as "naive psychology" because it is generally a theory about how individuals 
search for meaning in or explanations for other people's behavior (Taylor, Peplau, & 
Sears, 1997). Weiner (1985) proposed a model for understanding causal attributions, 
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which has led to the identification of three properties theorized to underlie causal 
attributions: 1) locus of causality, 2) stability, and 3) control (McAuley, Duncan, & 
Russell, 1992). The locus of causality dimension is concerned with identifying an 
internal (due to one's own self) or external (due to an outside influence) cause. Stability 
refers to whether or not a cause is invariant or unchangeable; such as, whether the cause 
is a relatively permanent feature (i.e., ability) or varies (i.e., luck). Lastly, the 
controllability dimension reflects whether the cause is within one's arena of control or 
outside of it. While current research has demonstrated that the three dimensions are 
conceptually distinct, and provide valuable insight into understanding the assignment of 
casual attributions (McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992), traditionally research focused 
on locus of causality (locus of control). 
Hayslip and Stewart-Bussey (1986-87) used the locus of control (LOC) dimension 
and examined its relationship with death anxiety. Results demonstrated that those 
subjects with higher internal LOC scores demonstrated less fear of death and death 
anxiety, while subjects with higher external LOC scores, powerful others and chance, 
demonstrated more fear of death and death anxiety. Additionally, higher scores on 
external-powerful others related to more fears specific to the dying process (i.e., loss of 
control, separation from loved ones). Examination of the sub-scales revealed that 
t "1 
externals who reported positive attitudes toward aging and death reported less anxiety 
than those externals who held negative attitudes. Results from this study suggest that it is 
important to examine the roles causal .attributions play in understanding death anxiety. 
The beliefs that one holds about one's self are inextricably linked with the beliefs 
that one holds about the world. For example, there is considerable evidence that 
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individuals believe that the world is just and attribute rewards or punishments as 
consequences of one's actions (Lerner, 1980). However, the fundamental attribution 
error illustrates the illusion of the just world because it enables individuals to justify 
blame for another's misfortune as a result or responsibility of that person's actions, yet to 
attribute blame to external factors for misfortune in one's own life. Nevertheless, belief 
in a just world generally enables people to view the world as controllable, predictable, 
and orderly (Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996), and predicts better coping and less 
distress in negotiating life's challenges (Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996; Lerner & 
Somers, 1992). 
Other studies have examined the effect of the belief in a just world on illness and 
health. For instance, Fife (1994; 1995) examined the process of ascribing meaning to 
illness and coping, and identified belief in a just world and personal control of events as 
factors that influence the meaning people attribute to illness. Subsequently, Fife (1994) 
reported that perceptions about the degree of control and belief in a just world affected 
whether patients were able to find some meaning from the illness, which further lead to 
better coping. In support of this relationship, Weir, Browne, Roberts, Tunks, and Gathi 
(1994) demonstrate that belief in a just world and controllability is predictive of patients' 
adjustment to chronic pain. These findings suggest that the relationship between one's 
beliefs about the self and the world shape the attributions one makes regarding the cause 
and effect of an event. Specifically, when an individual holds the belief that the world is 
just and that he/she has some from of control, then one can find meaning in the 
experience. Therefore, it is important to understand the interplay of one's causal 
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attributions and one's belief in a just world when trying to assess the meaning that one 
ascribes to death and the cumulative influence of these variables on death anxiety. 
In sum, one's beliefs about the self and the world influence the formulation of 
meaning of events in life, such as death; and as such, must be examined in tandem to 
understand their influence on death anxiety. 
Death Meaning 
Historical examination of the occurrence and significance of death has shifted 
from being a normal part of the life cycle to being an experience that is shrouded in 
secrecy and happens only to the elderly. Traditionally, Western societies dealt with death 
by seeking guidance and support from religion and solace from familial and community 
groups. However, since the industrial revolution, death has become depersonalized, and 
denial that death is a reality for all has been encouraged (see Kastenbaum, 1992). In 
1966, sociologist Robert Blauner argued that many of the social changes that 
accompanied the modernization of the West, such as increased life expectancy, medical 
advancements, and the diminished role of religion as the savior of the soul have 
contributed to isolation of the dying (Strack, 1997). Contemporarily, death became 
something to be feared and avoided at all costs; subsequently, death became a source of 
tremendous anxiety. However, since the beginning of the postmodern era in the 1950's, 
there has been a growing interest in attempts to understand the role that death plays in 
everyday life, as well as assessing the detrimental effects of the denial of death. This 
subtle shift in society's awareness of the importance of understanding what happens at 
the end of one's life, and how that understanding shapes our current and future lives, has 
led to a considerable amount of research in the field of death studies. 
16 
The relation between death meaning and death anxiety has generated considerable 
research. Baumeister (1991) suggests that an individual prescribes meaning to his/her 
life based on four tenets; consequently, these tenets can be used to describe the types of 
meanings that individuals proscribe to death as well. First, actions are interpreted in 
accordance with an ultimate life goal or purpose in life (e.g., the process of actualization). 
The meaning of death can also be described within this context, in that death is simply 
the closure of the material life (e.g.,' heaven was the goal for having lived the righteous 
life and death is but the doorway). Second, meaning serves as a justification of one's life 
choices; death will come by the means in which one lived his or her life (i.e., a solider 
accepts that death is an integral part of choosing to go to war). Third, meaning is 
determined by one's efficacy in their attempts to enhance the world: to have made the 
world a better place (e.g., the process of individuation, that one's life has had a positive 
impact on the future). Death is the final judge of the individual's work (e.g., parent, 
prizewinner, financial genius) thus it urges one to act in accordance with one's goals. 
Finally, meaning is found by achieving a sense of respect for the cycle of life; such that, 
one must also respect death since it is but another part of life. However, in postmodern 
society, death has not typically been embraced with the same regard as life, and the four 
tenets of life have not typically been attributed to the meaning of death. Instead many 
commonly portray death as destructive or negative; consequently, death is routinely 
viewed only in terms of personal loss and as the destruction of one's identity. 
Accordingly, death meaning has been examined only narrowly as avoidance and fear of 
death. 
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This fearful conceptualization of the meaningfulness of death is considered too 
simplistic to explain the diverse expressions displayed in reaction to death and dying 
experiences. In attempting to revise this narrow conceptualization of death, Wong, 
Reker, and Gesser (1994) have included an additional component to death 
meaningfulness, death acceptance. It should be noted that death acceptance is not the 
categorical opposite of fear of death, but that it "coexist[s] in an uneasy truce" (Feifel, 
1990, p. 539). In an attempt to further investigate the concept of death acceptance, 
Wong, Reker, and Gesser (1994) outline three sub-components: neutral acceptance, 
approach acceptance, and escape acceptance. Neutral acceptance can be described as the 
resignation of awareness that death is an integral part of life and is unchangeable; 
therefore, the person neither fears nor welcomes death. Approach acceptance implies a 
belief in some type of afterlife, and has been correlated with religious beliefs and 
practices (Berman, 1974; Neimeyer, 1994). Approach acceptance is likened to 
Baumeister's (1991) first and second tenets; in that, death is viewed as an integral 
component of life that issues forth the next phase of existence. These tenets are typically 
expressed by most religious descriptions of an afterlife as positive and the result of a 
purposeful life; therefore, death is interpreted as a period of metamorphosis (i.e., as a 
transmogrification from the physical to the spiritual realm) and not as a final outcome. 
Finally, escape acceptance is defined as a release from a life of pain or misery. One's 
attitude toward death then is not specifically viewed as 'good', but is more positive than 
the 'adversity' of living (Neimeyer, 1994, Vernon 1972); such that, death provides a 
release or escape from suffering. The inclusion of the construct of death acceptance, 
which has often been misidentified as denial, within the construct of death 
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meaningfulness includes the assessment of the positive impact that beliefs in an afterlife 
and/or death as an escape have on the individual. Furthermore, the conception of a 
transmogrification of the soul or of an afterlife in any form underlies the importance of 
assessing the role of spirituality/religiosity in one's meaning of death. 
Several studies have examined the role of religious practices and death anxiety 
(Holcomb, Neimeyer, & Moore, 1993; Moore & Neimeyer, 1993; Tobacyk, 1984). 
However, there has been difficulty assessing the role of religious beliefs and its 
relationship to one's meaning of death. Numerous studies have tended to measure 
religiosity in a simple unidimensional fashion; such as, use of inventories of religious 
behaviors, which included denomination identification, frequency of attendance, religious 
membership, and attendance records (Gay, 1985; Neimeyer, Dingemans, & Epting 1977; 
Thorson & Powell, 1990). Many of these studies have reported conflicting results; for 
example, Krieger, Epting and Leitner (1974), found no relation between beliefs in an 
afterlife and death anxiety. However, in this study, the authors' measure of beliefs in an 
afterlife was not well described, thus the nature of these findings was somewhat 
ambiguous. Rigdon and Epting (1985) report that subjects that hold beliefs in an 
afterlife, have frequent church attendance, and read religious materials have less death 
anxiety than a comparison group. While the measure for beliefs in an afterlife was again 
not well described, the information regarding religious practices was helpful. A general 
pattern of findings emerge .from these studies; such that, subjects who had a deep 
philosophical conviction in or were otherwise intrinsically motivated by their 
religious/spiritual beliefs were less likely to be threatened by the possibility of death, and 
thus reported less death anxiety. Generally, we find that traditional religious beliefs ( e.g., 
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the Judeo-Christian domain) and death anxiety are negatively correlated (i.e., stronger 
beliefs indicated less death anxiety). Overall, the content and strength of an individual's 
religious/spiritual beliefs must be addressed so as to understand their influence on the 
development of one's meaning of death. 
The interrelationships between death salience, beliefs about the self and the 
world, death meaning, and death anxiety described by the Death Anxiety Model could 
help us to delineate the process of death anxiety when one is facing the prospect of death 
and dying. To identify the combined effects of these components for individuals who 
vary on death salience, the DAM was employed to investigate personal construction 
systems of individuals who have been confronted with severe illness and the prospect of 
death in their lives. The meanings that one ascribes to life and death have been outlined 
as being of key importance in the understanding of death anxiety. In correspondence 
with this premise, Personal Construct Theory outlines the possible mechanism for the 
development of meaning within the individual. 
Personal Construct Theory 
Personal construct theory addresses how an individual organizes perceptions 
about the world to interpret or construe life events to create a construct system. A 
construct system must come about developmentally; in that, the meaning of any construct 
is dependent in part on the context in which it is presented, as well as the domain of 
experiences which the individual builds upon to construe an event. The fundamental 
postulate of personal construct theory states that a person will interpret and organize 
expectations of future events in light of previous beliefs and past experiences (Kelly, 
1963). The experience cycle (see Figure 2) illustrates this fundamental postulate and 
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clarifies how change occurs in one's construct system. The expectations that one has 
about an event sets the experience cycle in motion. The level of investment in the 
expectation will further influence one's interpretation of the event. These interpretations 
will serve to either confirm or disconfirm the anticipated outcome. For example, if one 
has not had any experience with a dead body one may hypothesize or anticipate that the 
sight of an open casket at a funeral will be distressing. If the individual is committed to , 
this expectation, then even before the event the individual may become distressed; 
however, if the expectation is invalidated, such that the funeral experience is not 
distressing but peaceful, then a revision of the pre-existing construct system will be 
facilitated. Therefore, every experience that one has will serve to confirm or disconfirm 
constructs about the world, executing both small changes as well as the incorporation of 
entirely new schemas, into one's construct system as a result of either a successful or 
unsuccessful construal of the world (Feshbach, Weiner & Bohart, 1996). Kelly asserted 
that in a quest to understand and forecast the events around them, individuals formulate 
hypotheses, collect data that either confirm or disconfirm the posed hypotheses, and then 
reconcile the new information into the personal construct system. Core constructs define 
and maintain the individual's unique identity and take precedence over subordinate 
constructs, such as those that are situational and external to the individual (Feshbach, 
Weiner, & Bohart, 1996). In other words, the core constructs are founded on the 
accumulation of experiences and beliefs, while subordinate constructs are in flux and are 
evaluated within each new experience cycle. It is through the process of this experience 
cycle that each individual creates a unique set of core and subordinate constructs from 
which to interpret the world. 
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Anxiety occurs when an individual is unable to interpret or construe an event 
from their existing system of core constructs, or when an event disconfirms a core 
personal construct. Anxiety therefore is a necessary precondition for construct change. 
When major beliefs about the nature of one's personal and social world (i.e., beliefs in a 
just world) are challenged, the ensuing threat to the existing construct system is 
experienced as anxiety. This threat has also been identified in the field of cognitive 
psychology as the experience of cognitive dissonance; however, for the purposes of the 
current study this threat was characterized from the existential viewpoint and defined as 
anxiety. Threat, within the context of death anxiety can be identified as "the awareness 
of imminent, comprehensive change in one's core identity construct, those dimensions of 
meaning that one uses to define oneself as a living being" (Neimeyer, 1997-98, p. 102). 
The amount of threat (death anxiety) that one experiences is then dependent upon one's 
meaning of life and death, and whether or not death is compatible with one's personal 
core construct system. 
It becomes apparent that as death becomes more salient to the individual, either 
through a life threatening illness or loss of a loved one, one's personal construct of the 
meaning of life and death is likely to be threatened, and an increase in death anxiety may 
well be expected. Research on the topic of death anxiety has demonstrated that increased 
saliency is likely to increase death anxiety (Cella & Tross, 1987; Hoelter & Hoelter, 
1980; Knight & Elfenbein, 1993). Additionally, other studies that have examined the role 
of meaning of death and death anxiety (Berman, 1974; Holcomb, Neimeyer, & Moore, 
1993; Tobacyk, 1984) have shown that death anxiety decreases when individuals strongly 
believe that death has meaning. Thus, Personal Construct Theory will allow for the 
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examination of several integral and essential components that constitute death anxiety. 
Specifically, this is because the meaning that an individual places on a construct is of 
paramount importance and can be assessed. In other words, the commonality corollary of 
Personal Construct Theory, or the extent to which an individual employs a construct 
system of an event similarly to that of another (Kelley, 1963) allows for a systematic 
examination of death anxiety and death salience, because individuals follow a general 
course in developing death anxiety. For example, Cella and Tross (1987) reported that 
individuals demonstrate a high level of death anxiety at the time of a cancer diagnosis, 
which diminished over time regardless of the prognosis, suggesting that death salience 
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influences the increase in death anxiety. The experience of receiving a cancer diagnosis 
had an equivalent effect on each patient, because every patient showed an increase in 
death anxiety. However, the overall levels of death anxiety varied across individuals 
because each person builds a unique construct system, such that, the meaning that an 
individual ascribes to death also influences levels of death anxiety (Tobacyk, 1984). 
Therefore, the types of meanings that are likely to be ascribed to death are influenced by 
the beliefs that an individual has regarding one's self and the world. For example, the 
belief that the world is just and controllable in combination with spiritual well-being may 
lead individuals to become psychologically prepared for and thus view death with a sense 
of inevitability and acceptance. In sum, it is suggested that death salience (interpersonal 
or intrapersonal) will influence and be interpreted by the beliefs that one has about one's 
self (i.e., causal dimensions) and the world (i.e., belief in a just world and spiritual well- . 	• 
being); subsequently, influencing the meaning that an individual ascribes to death, and 
moderating the overall experience of death anxiety. Therefore, to examine the effect of 
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death salience on death anxiety the moderating effects of one's beliefs about the self and 
the world, and the meaning of death must be examined. 
Purpose of the Current Study 
The present study, working from the assumptions of Personal Construct Theory, 
employed the relational aspects of the Death Anxiety Model to predict death anxiety with 
death saliency, beliefs about the self and the world, and death meaning. 
Hypotheses 
1. It was hypothesized that beliefs about the self ( causal dimensions) and world (belief in 
a just world, Existential and Religious well-being) would positively correlate with 
positive death meanings: neutral acceptance, approach acceptance, and escape 
acceptance. Yet, would negatively correlate with negative death meanings: death fear 
and avoidance.0
2. It was hypothesi�ed that positive death meaning (neutral, approach, and escape) 
would be negatively correlated with death anxiety, and negative death meanings
( death fear and avoidance) would positively correlate with death anxiety.
3. It was hypothesized that death salience groups (intrapersonal - Cancer Survivors, 
interpersonal - Spouses, and no personal salience - Healthy) groups would differ on 
type of death meaning and death anxiety. Specifically, Spouses would have more 
negative death meanings and thus report higher death anxiety scores than either the 
Healthy or Cancer survivor groups.
4. It was hypothesized that the death salience groups would be predicted by beliefs about 
the self ( causal dimensions) and the world (belief in a just world, Existential 
and Religious well-being), death meaning (fear, avoidance, neutral acceptance, 




Three groups of participants were selected for participation in the current study. 
The first group was cancer patients in remission for at least one year but less than five 
years. The second group was comprised of the spouse or significant other of cancer 
survivors, other than those participating in the first group. The third group was 
comprised ofhealtliy,pedpleJhat had not experienced a diagnosis of cancer or the death 
of a loved one within th� last year. Only adults between the ages 30-65 years were 
' 
select.eel for participation. · The first ,group was sampled from patients that had been
treated by the Loma Linda University Medical Center Cancer Institute, and who had been 
in remission between 1995 and 1999. The second group was spouses and significant 
others of cancer survivors ( other than those selected for group 1) that received cancer 
treatments from the Loma Linda University Medical Center Cancer Institute, and who 
had been in remission between 1995 and 1999. The third group was healthy (i.e., no one 
diagnosed with a severe illness or chronic disease) patients randomly sampled from the 
Family Medicine Loma Linda University outpatient clinics. 
Materials 
The Revised Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992), the 
Global Belief in a Just World Scale (Lipkus, 1991), the Spiritual Well-Being Scale 
(SWBS) (Ellison, 1983), the Threat Index (Krieger, Epting, & Leitner, 1974), the Death 
Attitude Profile-Revised (DAP-R) (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1984), the Revised Death 
Anxiety Scale (RDAS) (Thorson & Powell, 1984), The Quality of Life Index (QoLI) 
(Spitzer, 1980), and a demographic survey were administered to all participants. 
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Beliefs about the self. The CDSII (See Appendix A) codes the participant's 
causal attributions along a series of semantic differential scales. Four dimensions are 
measured: 1) locus of causality, which concerns whether the cause originates from within 
or is external to the person, 2) stability, is the cause static or changeable over time, 3) 
personal controllability, is the cause something that can be controlled or uncontrolled by 
one's self, 4) external controllability, is the cause something that can be controlled or 
uncontrolled by someone:else., Support for the CDS reliability and validity has been 
reported in several studies ( see Russell, 1982), for the CDS II internal consistency was 
reported from several studies (McAuley et. al., 1992); locus of causality ((s ranged from 
� '\ t • 
. 60 to .71), stability c�usality ((s ranged from .66 to .68), personal control causality ((s 
ranged from .71 to .90), and external control causality ((s ranged from .71 to .92). The 
subject read a vignette that related to receiving a cancer diagnosis, then rates his/her 
opinion of the cause of the illness. There are 12 semantic differential items; each yields a 
score between 1 and 9. The total scores for each dimension are obtained by summing 
selected items: locus of causality= 1,6,9; stability= 3, 7, 11; personal control= 2,4, 10; 
external control= 5,8,12. 
Beliefs about the world. The GBJWS (See Appendix B) assesses the individual's 
global beliefs regarding each statement as it pertains to both one's self and to others. The 
GBJWS has seven items scored on a 6-point likert-type scale with higher scores 
indicating beliefs that the world is more just than unjust. Reliability for the GBJWS was 
established using Cronbach's alpha (r= .83) to assess internal consistency. Preliminary 
validation of the GBJWS states that the scale measures a single construct; convergent 
validity was established, and correlates with internal locus of control (r = .46), overall 
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trust (r = .26), and political justice (r = .44). Because the GBJWS is based on Rubin and 
Peplau's (1975) Just World Scale, the authors do not report specific validity estimates for 
the GBJWS. 
The SWBS was employed in this study because it is a measure of both religious 
and existential well-being (See Appendix C). Spiritual/Religious (the terms are used 
interchangeably in this measure) well-being is defined as an affirmation of a relationship 
with God, self, and community that nurtures and celebrates wholeness (Ellison, 1983). 
Whereas, Existential well-being is defined as the experience of finding purpose for the 
acts and goals that we have committed ourselves to, which ultimately provide meaning to 
life. The SWBS was selected specifically because it does not subscribe to any one 
religious affiliation, and is consistent with the basic tenants of personal construct theory. 
The SWBS is comprised of 20-items rated on a 6 point-Likert scale: (1) strongly agree to 
(6) strongly disagree. Odd numbered items assess religious well-being; even numbered 
items assess existential well-being. Preliminary research on the SWBS has demonstrated 
fair internal consistency (r = .62), and test-retest reliability (r = .78 to .96). Convergent 
validity was demonstrated with the Purpose of Life Test (r = .52) and with Intrinsic 
Religious Orientation (r = .67) (Ellison, 1983). Discriminant validity was not reported, 
however current research suggests that there is adequate discrimination between the 
SWBS and measures of situational or state dependent mood, suggesting that spiritual 
well-being is more stable than mood (Ellison, 1983). 
Death Meaning. Death Meaning was assessed with the Threat Index (TI-R), and 
the Death Attitude Profile-Revised (DAP-R). The TI-R (see Appendix D) was 
constructed in accordance with Kelly's personal construct theory; such that, one's 
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personal constructs can be identified and defined. The TI-R has three subscales: You or 
Your Present Life, with 25 pairs of dimensions each: You or Your Present Life (Self), 
Your Ideal Self (Ideal), and Your Own Death (Death). The subject then rates on a 7-
point Likert scale which dimension is most closely associated with his/her beliefs. The 
score on the TI-R constitutes the relevance or meaning of death in one's personal 
construct system. The meaning of death, or the amount that death is discrepant from the 
self, is assessed by summing the number of instances when scores on the Self and Death 
subscales are scored on the opposite sides (splits) of a construct. The number of splits or 
opposing sides is interpreted as how reluctantly the individual views death and the self on 
the same poles. Consequently, a high number of splits illustrate that the individual is 
unable to perceive death as a personal reality, or an event that can be reconciled into their 
existing construct system. No split is scored when either element of the pair is rated as 4, 
thus the split scores can range from 1 to 25. Research has demonstrated substantial 
evidence of internal consistency (r = .88 to .96), test-rest reliability (r = .64 to .90). 
Convergent validity (r = .30 to .58) was demonstrated using several instruments: the 
Death Anxiety Scale, the Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale, and Feifel Fear of Death 
Scale. Discriminant validity (r = -.01 to -.08) was demonstrated using the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory Lie Scale and the Social Desirability Scale (Neimeyer, 
Epting, & Rigdon, 1984). 
The DAP-R was also employed as a second measure of death meaningfulness 
(See Appendix E). The DAP-R is a multidimensional measure that assesses death 
acceptance, avoidance, as well as death fear. Additionally, three conceptually distinct 
facets of death acceptance can be assessed: neutral acceptance (e.g., death as a natural 
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aspect of life), approach acceptance (death is an entrance to a place of ultimate 
satisfaction), and escape acceptance (death is deliverance from pain and suffering). The 
DAP-R has 32-items which make up 5 subscales; Fear of death (7 items: 1, 2, 7, 18, 20, 
21, 32), Death Avoidance (5 items: 3, 10, 12, 19, 26), Neutral Acceptance (5 items: 6, 14, 
17, 24, 30), Approach Acceptance (10 items: 4, 8, 13, 15, 16, 22, 25, 27, 28, 31), and 
Escape Acceptance (5 items). Each question is rated on a 7-point Likert scale that ranges 
from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. Internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability of the five subscales (E = .65 to .97) has been established (Wong et al., 1994). 
Convergent validity (r = .16 to .61) was established for each sub-scale using a 
complementary measure of death anxiety, the Death Anxiety Scale. 
Death Anxiety. Death Anxiety was assessed by the Revised Death Anxiety Scale 
(RDAS). The RDAS is a straightforward questionnaire that assesses overt death anxiety, 
and has demonstrated sensitivity to age differences (See Appendix F). The RDAS has 25 
items rated on a 5-point Likert scale, which ranges from (0) for least anxiety to (4) for 
highest death anxiety. While few studies have utilized the RDAS, preliminary results 
from use of this measure suggest favorable internal consistency (r= .80, .83). •Construct 
validity has been suggested from studies examining the RDAS factorial structure, 
indicating that the items of the RDAS reflect the relevant content domain for the 
construct (Neimeyer, 1994). 
The Quality of Life Index (QoLI) was used to assess overall health and 
functioning (see Appendlic G). Because the type and severity of the cancer diagnoses that 
were included in this study, could have had differential impacts, the QoLI was used to 
assess the impact of the cancer on the survivors' and spouses' current quality of life. The 
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QoLI was specifically designed for use with cancer patients, although it has subsequently 
been used more broadly. The QoLI is comprised of 15 items that reflect 5 dimensions of 
quality of life: Activity, Daily living, Health, Support, and Outlook. The items are scores 
from 1 to 3 with increasing scores indicating greater well-being, and the category is then 
summed for a total score. Reliability estimates for the QoLI have been demonstrated 
internal consistency r = .77 to .80, and inter-rater reliability r = .74 to .84. Construct 
validity Ifas been demonstrated as well with discriminate validity estimates with the 
Hamilton Rating scale for depression r = -.068 and -.063 with the Brief Symptom 
Inventory anxiely scale. A brief demographic survey will also be presented to all 
participants (see Appendix H). Participants will provide information on their age, marital 
and family status, income and education, all of which have been suggested to influence 
one's meaning of death. Inconsistent findings examining age and gender differences 
have been reported in several studies. Examination of both age and gender differences 
will be explored in this study as possible covariates. 
Procedure 
Participants for both the Cancer survivor and Spouse groups were randomly 
selected from the Loma Linda University Cancer Institute database, screening for period 
of remission, age range, and marital status. Because of limitation in the database 
selection variables, Spouses could not be directly identified; thus, all.materials were 
addressed to a cancer survivor (one that had not been selected for the cancer Survivor 
group), and stamped "an important survey, for your spouse". Additionally, the consent 
letter indicated that the enclosed survey was for the cancer survivor's spouse to complete. 
All Participants were initially contacted through an introductory letter that included a 
32 
telephone number participants could use to indicate that they were unwilling to 
participate in the study (see Appendix I). The survey was mailed two weeks after the 
original mailing. The survey contained all of the measures, which required 
approximately one to one and half hours to complete. The participants were allotted 
approximately two weeks to finish the assessment packages. A secondary reminder letter 
was mailed to all participants three weeks after the survey was mailed (See Appendix J). 
All participants were treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists 
and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological Association, 1992). Discussion of death 
can be difficult for miany people; therefore, participants were reminded that they could 
choose to discontinue,participation at any time without penalty. All possible 
accommodations were made for the participants both during and after the assessment 
sessions. 
A quasi-experimental design was employed for the present study. Death salience 
effects were investigated using three groups differing on degree of death salience; 1) 
Intrapersonal death salience — Cancer Survivors, 2) Interpersonal death salience - Spouses 
of cancer survivors, and 3) No death salience-Healthy patients without a severe illness, 
any diagnosis of cancer, and who had not lost a loved one within the last year. 
Participants were told that they were answering questions on death attitudes, that some of 
the material they received may be distressing, and they were able to terminate 
participation at any time. 
The packet of surveys presented to each subject contained, in order, a consent 
from, the demographic survey, the DAP-R, the RDAS, the CDSII, the GBJW, the SWBS, 
the QoLI, and the TI-R. The instructions for each scale were included on the survey. 
Results 
Data Screening 
Five hundred sixty five surveys were mailed to the selected study participants 
representing the salience groups: 194 in the Healthy group, 181 in the Spouses of cancer 
survivors group, and 190 in the Cancer Survivors group. Forty-two subjects declined 
participation by returning a blank survey (13 healthy-no salience; 19 cancer survivors-
intrapersonal salience; and 11 spouses of cancer survivors-interpersonal salience). One 
hundred twenty five subjects returned usable surveys for a response rate of 22.1% (35 
healthy, 18.4%; 46 spouses of cancer survivors, 25.4%; 44 cancer survivors, 23.2%). 
Data screening identified 14 subjects that indicated a diagnosis of cancer (1 healthy; 13 
spouses of cancer survivors), these subjects were subsequently reassigned to the cancer 
survivor-intrapersonal salience group. Additionally, 4 subjects (2 cancer survivors; 2 
spouses of cancer survivors) were omitted from the data analysis because they indicated 
that they had experienced the loss of a spouse within the last year. Data analysis was 
then conducted on the remaining 121 subjects (34 healthy; 31 spouses of cancer 
survivors; and 56 cancer survivors). To verify that no statistical assumptions were 
violated, the data were screened for normality, all skew and kurtosis values were within 
acceptable limits (see Appendix K). There was a large proportion (51%) of missing data 
on the Threat Index-Revised, thus this scale was dropped from all analyses. The amount 
of missing data on all remaining dependent variables was reasonable; missing item 
ratings were replaced with the individual's scale mean for analyses. 
33 
34 
Baseline Differences Between Groups 
The salience groups were compared on demographic variables: age, gender, 
income, education level, marital status, ethnicity, or religious orientation (see Table 1). 
• The groups did not differ on age, gender, income, education level, ethnicity, and religious 
orientation. The groups did differ on marital status; fewer cancer survivors were married, 
x2 (2, N = 121) = 12.8,p = .00. The groups also differed on length of time married. The 
healthy group was married significantly less than either the Spouse or the Cancer 
survivor groups, F (2, 98) = 5.6,p = .01. Marital status and length of time married did 
not correlate with any of the predictor or outcome variables. However, while marital 
status has not been discussed in the literature as a predictive factor, the argument can be 
made that length of time of married could indicate a degree of marital intimacy or 
closeness. Therefore, all analyses were run both with and without the use of time married 
as a covariate. The covariate did not change the analytic outcomes on any of the 
dependent variables, except beliefs about the self. These findings will be presented 
following the analyses conducted without the covariate. 
Health Status Differences Between Groups 
The salience groups were compared on measures of health and wellness status 
variables and quality of life (see Table 2). The groups did not differ on physical health, 
financial quality of life, overall quality of life, spiritual quality of life, personal quality of 
life, family/social quality of life, QoLI-outlook, QoLI-activity, QoLI-daily living, QoLI-
health, or Qoll-support. 
Table 1 
Demographic Variables by Salience Group 
Healthy 
M SD 
Age 49.0 9.5 
Years Married * 15.9 11.1 
Gender 
Male 12 (35.3%) 
Female 22 (64.7%) 
Income $55,000-64,000 
Education 
No College 6 (18%) 
College 27 (82%) 
Married* 33 (97.1 %) 
Ethnicity 
White 24 (77.4%) 
Black 1 (3.2%) 
Latino 1 (3.2%) 
Asian/PI 4 (13.9%) 











1 (3.1 %) 
1 (3.1 %) 
, . 6 (1.8.8%) 
tr ' � . .. 
Salience Group 
Spouses Cancer Survivors 
M SD M SD 
53.7 7.9 52.8 10.5 
25.9 12.3 24.0 13.9 
13 (41.9%) 24 (42.9%) 
18 (58.1%) 32 (57.1%) 
$55,000-64,000 $45,000-54,000 
6 (24%) 9 (16%) 
25 (76%) 47 (84%) 
28 (90%) 39 (70%) 
28 (96.7%) 41 (78.6%) 
0 3 (2.4%) 
1 (3.3%) 5 (9.5%) 
0 2 (4.8%) 
0 2 (4.8%) 
15 (53.6%) 31 (63.3%) 
0 5 (10.2%) 
8 (28.6%) 8 (16.3%) 
0 0 
0 0 
5 (17.9%) 5 (10.2%) 
Table 2 
Health and Wellness Status by Salience Group 
Salience Group 
Cancer 
Healthy Spouses Survivors 
M SD M SD M SD 
Physical Health 3.0 0.8 2.9 0.7 2.9 0.7 
Mental Health 3.4 0.6 3.0 0.8 3.3 0.8 
Financial QoL 2.8 1.0 2.5 0.9 3.0 1.2 
Overall QoL 2.8 0.8 2.7 0.8 2.9 0.9 
Religious QoL 2.9 0.9 2.8 0.9 2.9 0.8 
Personal QoL 2.7 0.9 2.9 0.9 3.1 0.9 
2.8 1.0 2.9 1.0 2.9 1.0 
3.1 0.9 2.9 0.7 3.4 0.9 
1.1 0.3 1.3 0.5 1.3 0.5 
1.3 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.4 0.7 
1.0 0.2 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.2 
1.3 0.4 1.3 0.5 1.3 0.5 




QoLI daily living 
QoLI health 
QoLI support 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.3 1.1 0.4 
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Correlational Analyses 
Pearson correlations were examined within the death anxiety predictors (see Table 
3). External controllability was positively correlated with personal controllability and 
just world. Religious well-being was positively correlated with existential well-being, 
approach acceptance and escape acceptance. Fear of death was positively correlated with 
death avoidance. Both fear of death and death avoidance were negatively correlated with 
neutral acceptance. Approach acceptance was positively correlated with escape 
acceptance. 
Pearson correlations were examined between the predictors and death anxiety for 
all subjects (see Table 4). • Death anxiety was positively correlated with religious and 
existential well-being, fear of death, and death avoidance. Death anxiety was negatively 
correlated with neutral acceptance. , 
Group Differences on the Dependent Variables 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was employed to compare the 
salience groups on measures of beliefs about the self (casual attributions: locus of 
causality, stability, external control, and personal control). The multivariate F was 
significant (Roy's largest root), F (4, 92) = 2.8, p = .03, and therefore post hoc analyses 
were conducted. 
As indicated in Table 5, there was a significant mean difference between the 
salience groups on personal controllability concerning the cause of cancer, (Al Healthy = 
16.4; M Spouses — 13.6; M Cancer Survivors 12.6),F (2,96) = 3.3,p = .04. Pairvvise 
comparisons, with the Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD), of the salience 
Table 3 
Intercorrelations Between Components of the DAM 
Beliefs about the Beliefs about the 
	
Self 	 World 	 Death Meaning 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Beliefs about the Self 
(1) Personal 	1.0 
Control 
(2) External .27** 	1.0 
Control 
(3) Stability 	.15 	.07 	1.0 
Beliefs about the World 
(4) Just World 	.13 	.23* 	-.08 	1.0 
(5) Religious -.11 	.06 	.03 	-.10 	1.0 
well-being 
(6) Existential 
.07 	.13 	.05 	.00 	.48** 	1.0 
well-being 
Death 
(8) Death -.11 	.05 	.01 	.12 	.10 	-.07 	.53** 	1.0 
Avoidance 
(9) Neutral 
-.17 -.10 .18 -.05 -.10 .04 -.25** -.25** 1.0 
Acceptance 
(10) Approach -.08 	-.10 	-.19 	.52** 	.04 	-.10 	.00 	.04 	1.0 
Acceptance 	 .10 
(11) Escape -.04 -.12 .05 .07 .21* -.03 .10 .11 -.11 35** 1.0 
Acceptance 
p* <.05, p** <.01 
Death Meaning 
(7) Fear of -.10 	.01 	.12 	.13 	.02 	-.15 	1.0 
Table 4 
Intercorrelations Between Components of the DAM and Death Anxiety 
Beliefs about the Self 









Beliefs about the World 
Just World .10 
Religious well-being .23* 
Existential well-being .23* 
Death Meaning 
Fear of Death .71** 
Death Avoidance .40** 
Neutral Acceptance -.23* 
Approach Acceptance -.08 
Escape Acceptance ' .12 
<.05, p** <.01 
Table 5 
Salience Group Differences on Beliefs about the Self 
Salience Group 
Cancer 
Healthy 	Spouses 	Survivors 
Mean Mean Mean 	Sum of 
(SD) 	(SD) 	(SD) Squares 	F 	Sig. 
Locus of 	16.7 	16.4 	14.7 
Causality (4.6) (5.3) (4.8) 	82.6 	1.8 	.18  
External 	14.9 	12.6 	12.5 
Controllability 	(4.7) (5.2) (5.8) 
109.4 	1.9 	.15 
12.4 	12.2 	13.3 Stability 	 22.9 	.69 	.50 (2.8) (4.5) (4.5) 
Personal 	16.3 	13.4 	13.0 
Controllability 	(5.6) (6.0) (5.3) 
205.9 	3.3 	.04* 
*p<.05 
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groups demonstrated that the Healthy group was significantly higher than the Spouses 
(Mean Difference = 3.3,p = .04) on personal controllability. 
To test the effect of the covariate on beliefs about the self, the outcome variables 
(locus of causality, stability, external control, personal control) were regressed on the 
covariate (length of time married) and the standardized residuals were saved as variables 
for further analyses. Subsequently, a MANOVA was employed to compare the salience 
groups on the standardized residuals of beliefs about the self (casual attributions: loc, 
stability, external control, and personal control). The multivariate F was not significant, 
F (4, 77) = 2.0, p = .09, and therefore no post hoc analyses were conducted. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was employed to compare the 
salience groups on measurs of beliefs about the world (Just World and Religious and 
Existential wellbeing). The multivariate F was significant (Roy's largest root), F (3,100) 
3.5, p = .02, and therefore post hoc analyses were conducted. 
As indicated in Table 6, there was a significant mean difference between the 
salience groups on existential well-being, (A/r Healthy = 38.7; M Spouses = 44.6; M Cancer 
Survivors = 41.7), F (2,103) = 5.2,p = .01. Pairwise comparisons, with the Tukey HSD, of 
the salience groups demonstrated that the Healthy group was significantly lower than the 
Spouses (Mean Difference = -5.9, p = .01) on existential well-being. 
To test the effect of the covariate on beliefs about the world the outcome variables 
(just world, Religious well-being, and Existential well-being) were regressed on the 
covariate (length of time married) and the standardized residuals were and saved as 
variables for further analyses. Subsequently, a MANOVA was employed to compare the 
salience groups on the standardized residuals of beliefs about the world (just world, 
Table 6 















































'Religious well-being, and Existential well-being). The multivariate F was also 
significant, F (3, 82) = 4.2, p = .01, and therefore post hoc analyses were conducted. 
There was a significant mean difference between the salience groups on 
existential well-being, F (2,85) = 6.2, p = .00. Pairwise comparisons, with the Tukey 
HSD, of the salience groups demonstrated that the Healthy group was significantly lower 
than the Spouses (Mean Difference = -.88, p = .00) and the Cancer Survivors (Mean 
Difference = -.57, p = .05) on existential well-being. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was employed to compare the 
salience groups on death meaning (fear of death, death avoidance, neutral acceptance, 
approach acceptance, and escape acceptance). The multivariate F was significant (Roy's 
largest root), F (5,94) = 2.5, p = .04, and therefore post hoc analyses were conducted. 
As indicated in Table 7, there was a significant mean difference between the 
salience groups on death fear (A/1 Healthy = 2.9; M Spouses = 3.7; M Cancer Survivors = 3.1), F 
(2,99) = 3.2,p = .05. Pairwise comparisons, with the Least Significant Difference (LSD), 
of the salience groups demonstrated that the Spouses were significantly higher than the 
Healthy (Mean Difference = .80, p = .03) or Cancer Survivors (Mean Difference = .70, p 
= .03) on death fear. Due to the low power of this study the univariate test of death 
avoidance was not significant, but demonstrates a trend F (2,99) = 2.9, p = .06. 
To test the effect of the covariate on death meaning, the outcome variables fear 
of death, death avoidance, neutral acceptance, approach acceptance, and escape 
acceptance) were regressed on the covariate (length of time married) and the standardized 
residuals were and saved as variables for further analyses. Subsequently, a MANOVA 
was employed to compare the salience groups on the standardized residuals of death 
Table 7 
Salience Group Differences on Death Meaning 
Salience Group 
Cancer 
Healthy 	Spouses 	Survivors 
Mean Mean Mean 	Sum of 
(SD) 	(SD) 	(SD) Squares 	F 	Sig. 
Fear of 	2.9 3.7 3.1 
10.2 	3.2 	.05 Death (1.3) 	(1.1) 	(1.3) 




Neutral 	5.6 	5.6 	5.6 
Acceptance 	(1.0) (0.8) (0.9) 
Approach 	5.1 	4.9 	5.2 
Acceptance (1.5) (1.6) (1.4) 
Escape 	4.3 	4.8 	4.0 
Acceptance 	(1.3) (1.4) (1.6) 
	
10.5 	2.9 	.06 
.00 	.02 	.98 
.8 	.20 	.84 
10.7 	2.4 	.10 
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meaning (fear of death, death avoidance, neutral acceptance, approach acceptance, and 
escape acceptance beliefs about the world). The multivariate F was also significant, F (5, 
76) = 3.1,p = .01, and therefore post hoc analyses were conducted. There was a 
significant mean difference between the salience groups on death fear (11/1  Healthy = -.16; M 
Spouses — .47; M Cancer Survivors — 	F (2,81) = 4.4, p = .02). Pairwise comparisons, with 
the LSD, of the salience groups demonstrated that the Spouses were significantly higher 
than the Healthy (Mean Difference = .63, p = .02) and the Cancer Survivors (Mean 
Difference = .72, p = .01) on death fear. There was also significant mean difference 
between the salience groups on death avoidance (M Healthy = -.20; M Spouses = .42; M Cancer  
Survivors — -•16), F (2,99) = 3.2, p = .05. Pairwise comparisons, with the LSD, of the 
salience groups demonstrated that the Spouses were significantly higher than the Healthy 
(Mean Difference = .62, p = 03) and the Cancer Survivors (Mean Difference = .57, p = 
.03) on death avoidance. 
There were no significant differences between the salience groups on death 
meanings neutral acceptance, approach acceptance, or escape acceptance. 
An ANOVA was employed to compare the salience groups on death anxiety. The 
analysis revealed that the salience groups differed on death anxiety (M Healthy = 55.2; M 
Spouses = 64.2; M cancer survivors = 59.4), F (2,111) = 3.'7,p = .03. Pairwise comparisons, with 
the Tukey HSD, of the salience groups demonstrated that the Spouses were significantly 
higher than the Healthy group (Mean Difference = 9.1, p = .02) on death anxiety. 
To test the effect of the covariate on death anxiety the outcome variable was 
regressed on the covariate (length of time married) and the standardized residuals were 
and saved as the variable for further analyses. Subsequently, an ANOVA was employed 
46 
to compare the salience groups on the standardized residuals of death anxiety. The 
univariate F was also significant, F (2, 89) = 3.4, p = .04, and therefore post hoc analyses 
were conducted. 
Pairwise comparisons, with the Tukey HSD, of the salience groups demonstrated 
that the Spouses were significantly higher than the Healthy group (Mean Difference = 
.66, p = .03) and the Cancer Survivors (Mean Difference = -.57, p = .05) on death 
anxiety. 
Discriminant Function Analyses 
Separate discriminant function analyses were conducted to predict group 
membership, with and without utilizing length of time married. Classification of group 
membership for both analyses was predicted with length of time married, external 
control, personal control)ust world, Existential well-being, death fear, death avoidance, 
neutral acceptance, approach acceptance, escape acceptance, and death anxiety. These 
predictors were_ selectedbecause of the correlation patterns among the variables. The 
discriminant function analysis that did not include length of time married only classified 
55.8% of the cases; however, the discriminant function analysis that included length of 
time married correctly classified 70.3% of the cases (see Table 8). 
Table 8 
Discriminant function classification results* 
Predicted Group Membership 
Cancer 
Healthy Spouses Survivors Total 
Healthy 20 (87.0%) 1 (4.3%) 2 (8.7%) 23 (100%) 
Spouses 4 (23.5%) 10 (58.8%) 3 (17.6%) 17 (100%) 
Cancer Survivors 5 (20.8%) 4(16.7%) 15 (62.5%) 24 (100%) 
* 70.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified 
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A higher percentage of the Healthy group (87.0%) was correctly classified than either the 
Spouse (58.8%) or Cancer Survivor (62.5%) groups. Examination of the groups' cross 
loadings showed that the Spouses cross loaded with the Healthy (23.5%), while Cancer 
Survivors also cross loaded with the Healthy group (20.8%). Test of the functions 
identified one significant function, A= .48,p = .01 (see Appendix L for Territorial Map). 
Length of time married, Existential well-bei�g, external controllability, and personal 
controllability loaded on the first function, while death fear, death avoidance, escape 
acceptance, and death anxiety loaded on the second function; just world, neutral 
acceptance, and approach acceptance did not adequately load on either function (see 
Table 9). 
Table 9 
Discriminant Function:Structure Matrix 
Length of time married 




Personal Control -.41 * 
External Control -.22 
Approach Acceptance .19 
Just World -.09 
Neutral Acceptance -.00 
Death Avoidance .15 
Death Fear .12 
Escape Acceptance .11 














Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function 
* Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function
Discussion 
" The purpose of the present stuqy-was to examine the interpersonal/relational 
aspects of the Death Anxiety Mode.I by specifically examining how death saliency, 
beliefs about the self and the world, and death meaning predict death anxiety. The 
interpersonal/relational pathway of the model was examined in an attempt to identify how 
an individual's experiences with the world interact with personal beliefs and attributions, 
to culminate in death anxiety. Additionally, Personal Construct Theory was utilized to 
provide the framework regarding how perceptions about the world and the interpretation 
of life events create and modify construct systems. Specifically, how do differing levels 
of death salience alter one's core construct system regarding death, and thus the 
experience of death anxiety? Four hypotheses were investigated: 1) beliefs about the self 
(causal dimensions) and world (belief in a just world, existential and religious well­
being) would positively correlate with positive death meanings. Yet, would negatively 
correlate with negative death meanings; 2) positive death meaning (neutral, approach, 
and escape) would be negatively correlated with death anxiety, and negative death 
meanings ( death fear and avoidance) would positively correlate with death anxiety; 3) 
death salience groups (intrapersonal, interpersonal, and no personal salience) would differ 
on type of death meaning and death anxiety. Specifically, that the Spouses would have 
more negative death meanings and thus report higher death anxiety scores than either the 
Healthy or Cancer survivor groups; and 4) the death salience groups would be predicted 
by beliefs about the self and the world, death meaning, and death anxiety. 
The initial hypothesis was partially supported. The beliefs about the self ( causal 
attributions) and the beliefs about the world (Just World and Existential well-being) 
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were not correlated with either the positive or negative death meanings. However, 
religious well-being was positively related to the positive death meanings that provide a 
more definitive understanding of death. Specifically, approach acceptance is a belief in 
an afterlife or a period of transition to a higher existence after death, and Escape 
Acceptance is a release from the bonds of physical existence and physical suffering. 
Thus, an acceptance of death that allows for some sense of future continuity (an afterlife) 
or release from suffering is consistent with one's overall spiritual belief system. 
Additionally, both Religious and Existential well-being were positively related to death 
anxiety, indicating that although one may hold a positive death meaning of everlasting 
life and a release from suffering; one's comfort in life from God and overall life 
satisfaction does not inoculate against the threat of death. Because death impedes and 
disrupts one's goals and sense of earthly purpose, it is more anxiety provoking for those 
who have a strong sense of purpose to their lives. Death as the end of their personal 
being, above and beyond beliefs about life and about death remains anxiety provoking. 
The comfort and interest in life leads to a distancing from death even if death may be a 
release and hold the promise of continuity. 
The second hypothesis was also partially supported; it was expected that negative 
death meanings would be strongly related to death anxiety; yet, neutral acceptance, was 
the only positive death meaning negatively related to death anxiety. One possible 
explanation is that neutral acceptance provides a more superficial acknowledgment of 
death as inevitable, and does not provide for a substantive or comforting meaning in the 
face of the existential crisis. Thus, neutral acceptance does not ameliorate the tensions 
aroused by death. Alternatively, a positive death meaning may not be powerful enough 
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to alleviate death anxiety; in that, the loss of one's personal identity is a severe shock to 
one's core construct system. 
The third hypothesis was supported; the death salience groups (intrapersonal -
Cancer Survivors, interpersonal - Spouses, and no personal salience - Healthy) did differ 
on type of death meaning and level of death anxiety. Spouses were generally more likely 
to ascribe a negative meaning ( fear and avoidance) to death than either the Healthy group 
or the Cancer Survivors, and subsequently reported a greater degree of death anxiety. 
These results are theoretically consistent, in so far as the Spouses experience just enough 
interpersonal threat to upset their core construct system; thus, a negative death meaning is 
attributed. However, this interpersonal threat is not severe enough to cause them to 
revise their core construct system and incorporate this threat enough to subsequently 
decrease death anxiety. Conversely, the Cancer survivors, having faced an immediate 
and personal threat of death were more likely to reconcile the experience into their core 
construct system, and thus demonstrated decreased death anxiety. 
Finally, it was hypothesized that the death salience groups would be predicted by 
beliefs about the self ( causal dimensions) and the world (belief in a just world, Existential 
and Religious well-being), death meaning (fear, avoidance, neutral acceptance, approach 
acceptance, and escape acceptance), and death anxiety. The discriminant analyses 
revealed that those principles that are personally relevant did predict group membership. 
Examination of the first discriminant function suggests that the depth of the marital 
relationship (as assessed by length of time together) is important to understanding the 
anxiety of loss to one's self as well as to one's spouse. Additionally, the second 
discriminant function demonstrated that death anxiety and those death meanings that 
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share the same essential characteristics of negative affect are cohesive. Generally, the 
experience of death anxiety and fear will likely vary depending on one's level of personal 
death salience. These findings are consistent with the literature in that, personal 
confrontations of mortality force a reconciliation between one's beliefs about death and 
bond to the existential crisis. The degree of exposure does moderate the experience of 
death anxiety by changing the intensity of this contemplative experience. 
No specific hypotheses were generated in regard to beliefs about the self and the 
world; however, it was demonstrated that the salience groups differed on some beliefs 
about the self (personal controllability) and the world (existential well-being). The 
Healthy were more likely to hold personal controllability attributes in the development of 
cancer, while the Spouses and Cancer survivors, perhaps due to personal experience with 
the disease, were less likely to make personal controllability attributions. 
However; the opposite relation was shown for existential well-being: Spouses 
reported a greater degree of purpose in life and meaning than the Healthy group. For the 
Cancer survivors, the threat of death was enough to shake the core construct system, and 
lead to a more guarded view of the ,future. Conversely, the Spouses may find hope in 
their partner's recovery and have not probed their core construct system deeply enough to 
readdress the purpose of life. 
As previously mentioned, the death anxiety literature has demonstrated conflicting 
findings regarding age differences; however, the nature of these differences has not been 
well described (Cicerelli, 1998; Galt & Hayslip, 1998; Hoelter & Hoelter, 1980-1981). 
Additionally, the majority of death attitude research has been conducted using 
convenience samples of young adults (college students). These limitations have lead 
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many to question the validity of age generalizations (Durlak & Kass, 1981; Keller, 
Sherry, & Piotrowski, 1984; Noppe & Noppe, 1997). It is worth mentioning, that no age 
differences were identified in the current study, although it should be noted that the age 
range was restricted to adulthood (30 to 66 years). Thus, this study adds to the literature 
by using an age range that has been less commonly sampled. 
Marital status and duration of marriage were identified as covariates. The effect of 
the covariate was most pronounced in attempting to predict group membership. The 
inclusion of length of time married dramatically increased the ability to predict the death 
salience groups. This finding may indicate that death attitudes are affected by close or 
intimate partner's illness experience; these findings also suggest that one's sense of 
mortality may be inextricably linked with that of his or her spouse. The threat of one's 
own mortality may cause reorganization of core beliefs while the threat of the loss of a 
spouse or significant other creates only enough reorganization to create dissonances and 
anxiety. 
This investigation supports findings previously reported that indicate that 
intrapersonal death salience generates enough threat to change a core construct system; 
such that, the individual is forced to reconcile what death means, thereby confronting the 
existential crisis, and subsequently decreasing death anxiety. For example, the current 
investigation replicated a finding reported by Cella and Tross (1987), which illustrated 
that cancer survivors, regardless of diagnosis and prognosis, demonstrated decreased 
death anxiety over time. By comparison, Hoelter and Hoelter (1980) reported that 
interpersonal death salience (death of someone close to the person) demonstrates an 
increase in death anxiety over time; this investigation again replicated these findings. 
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Thus, it seem� tha(death salience effects on death anxiety follows a consistent pattern: 
"" :  - I �"C 
Intrapersonal death salience (cancer survivors) leads to decreased death anxiety, while 
interpersonal death salience (spouses of cancer survivors) leads to increased death 
,r 
anxiety. 
Previous literature has demonstrated that the fear of a significant other's death and 
overall increased death anxiety are positively related to religiosity (Gay, 1985; Neimeyer, 
Dingemans, & Epting 1977; Thorson & Powell, 1990). Accordingly, the present 
investigation showed that positive death meanings demonstrated a positive relationship 
with one's religious well-being and overall existential sense of purpose, and death 
anxiety. Alternatively, the DAM posits that one's beliefs about the self and the world 
would moderate death meaning.and the experience of death anxiety. However, these data 
do not fully support this hypothesized pathway. Additionally, a direct influence of death 
salience on death anxiety was found in the present examination, thus the DAM may need 
to be revised to include a direct pathway to account for this effect. 
Moreover, the casual dimensions did not perform as hypothesized, yet were 
consistent with theory and practice. For instan�e, personal controllability was found to 
differ among the groups. Specifically, the spouses and cancer survivors perceived less 
personal control over cancer than the healthy group; however, the spouses were also more 
likely to attribute the perceived cause of cancer to an external agent. These findings 
indicate that the attribution processes differed by degree of death salience; however, the 
vignette used in this study to examine the attribution process did not fully capture the 
differences between the groups. In other words, the attributions examined for the spouses 
of cancer survivors were not solely measuring one's beliefs about the self, but instead 
54 
were perhaps manifestations of empathy, guilt and fear for their spouses whom had 
survived cancer. Thus, this limitation may be a direct result of an inappropriate vignette; 
in that, the nonspecific threat of a general diagnosis of cancer may not have been 
sufficiently impacting to capture the attributions people make regarding the development 
of a life threatening disease. Generally suggesting that the measures utilized in the 
present study were not sensitive enough or did not correctly operationally define the 
beliefs about the self and the world constructs of the DAM. 
The generalizabilty of the findings from the present study are limited due to the 
small sample size and low response rate. The low response rate may be indicative of a 
selection bias common when attempting to study attitudes and beliefs about death and 
dying so that those who are the most death anxious did not participate, and those who do 
may be more willing to address fears and concerns regarding mortality. Indeed it seems 
that the topic of human mortality, though it may elicit a morbid fascination for some, may 
prompt ambivalence or avoidance in many. This sense of ambivalence may have been 
illustrated by the fact that the spouses reported a stronger sense of existential well-being, 
yet were also the most. anxious about death. Indeed, the response rate for the spousal 
group was the highest of the three groups. Perhaps the conflicting cognitions and 
emotions of the spouses were provoked during the process of reconstructing the core 
construct system. In other words, the Spouses' willingness to participate may have 
fulfilled an existential need to reconcile the exposure of cancer in their spouse and 
conflicting beliefs and attributions about the cause of cancer with the threat of death. The 
implications of these findings suggest that the experience of severe illnesses have 
differential effects on the patient and their significant other. Such that, when providing 
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supports for patients' coping with a li_f� threatening illness, like cancer, support should be
provided to their significant others over time. However, the nature and aspects of this 
support may need to focus on different factors than those of cancer survivors. 
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Appendix A 
Revised Causal Dimension Scale (CDSII) 
McAuley, Duncan, & Russell (1992) 
Please answer the following questions in response to the following statement. 
You have been feeling "not quite right" for the last few months. However, 
you ignore it until your next physical exam. Upon visiting your physician for 
your routine physical you are given a diagnosis of cancer. 
Is the cause (s) something:. 
1. That reflects an 
aspect of yourself 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Reflects an aspects of 
the situation 
2. Manageable by you 9 5 4 3 2 1 Not manageable by you 
3. Permanent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Temporary 
4. You can regulate 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 You cannot regulate 
5. Over which others 
have control 
9 8 6 5 4 3 2 1 Over which others have 
no control 
6. Inside of you 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Outside of you 
7. Stable over time 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Variable over time 
8. Under the power of 
other people 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Not under the power of 
other people 
9. Something about 
you 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Something about others 
10. Over which you 
have power 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Over which you have 
no power 
11. Unchangeable 9 8 6 5 4 3 2 1 Changeable 
12. Other people can 
regulate 




Global Belief in a Just World Scale 
Lipkus (1991) 
Instructions for the Global Belief in a Just World Scale: 
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements. 
Please consider the statement in respect to yourself as well as others. 
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately disagree
3 = Mildly disagree
4 = Mildly agree 
5 = Moderately agree 
6 = Strongly agree 
1. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.
2. I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded.
3. I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.
4. I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves.
5. I feel that people get what they deserve.
6. I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given.




Spiritual Well-Being Scale 
Elliason (1983) 
Instructions to participants. 
For each of the following statements circle the choice that best indicates the 





experience. ·· · _: 
>, ' 
(1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) moderately agree; (4) moderately disagree; (5)
-< • 
• 
disagree; and ( 6) strongly d�sagree. 
1. I don't find much satisfaction in private prayer with God.
2. I don't know who I am, where I came from, or where I'm going.
3. I believe that God loves me and cares about me.
4. I feel that life is a positive experience.
5. I believe that God is impersonal and not interested in my daily situations.
6. I feel unsettled about my future.
7. I have a personally meaningful relationship with God.
8. I feel very fulfil ed and satisfied with life.
9. I don't get much personal strength and support from my God.
10. I feel a sense of well-being about the direction my life is headed in.
11. I believe that God is concerned about my future.
12. I don't enjoy much about life.
13. I don't have a personally satisfying relationship with God.
14. I feel good about my future.
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15. My relationship with God helps me not to feel lonely.
16. I feel that life is full of conflict and unhappiness.
1 7. I feel most fulfilled when I am in close communion with God.
18. Life doesn't have much meaning.
19. My relation with God contributes to my sense of well-being.
20. I believe there is some real purpose for my life.
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Appendix D 
Threat Index: Provide Forms (TI-R) 
Nenneyer, Epting, & Rigdon (1983) 
Instruction for the Threat Index-Revised 
1. You or Your Present Life (Self element) 
Below is a list of 25 dimensions, each of which is made up of a pair of opposite 
constructs. For each dimension, please decide which one of the pair (the left or right 
side) describes you or your present life more closely. Then, indicate whether you 
strongly agree, moderately agree, or mildly agree with the dimension by circling a 
number. In a few cases, you may feel as if both sides describe you to some degree. If 
both sides of the dimension describe you equally, then circle the middle response 
(i.e., the 4). For example, do you see yourself as more healthy or sick? Please circle 
only one number for each of the 25 dimensions. 
2. Your Ideal Self (Preferred self element) 
For each of the 25 dimensions, please decide which one of the pair (the left or right 
• side) describes you more closely associate with your ideal self or the way you would 
prefer to be living. Then, indicate whether you strongly agree, moderately agree, or 
mildly agree with the dimension by circling a number. You do not need to circle the 
dimension, just the number. In a few cases, you may feel as if both sides describe 
your ideal self to some degree. If both sides of the dimension describe your ideal self 
equally, then circle the middle response (i.e., the 4). For example, do you see 
yourself as more healthy or sick? Please circle only one number for each of the 25 
dimensions. 
3. Your Own Death (Death element) 
For each of the 25 dimensions, please decide which one of the pair (the left or right 
side) describes you more closely associate with your own death, thinking of your own 
death as if it were to occur at this time in your life. Then, indicate whether you 
strongly agree, moderately agree, or mildly agree with the dimension by circling a 
number. You do not need to circle the dimension, just the number. In a few cases, 
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you may feel as if both sides describe your own death to some degree. If both sides 
of the dimension describe your own death equally, then circle the middle response 
(i.e., the 4). For example, do you see yourself as more healthy or sick? Please circle 





1 = Strongly agree with left dimension 
2 == Moderately agree with left dimension 
3 = Mildly agree with left dimension 
4 = Equally agree with both dimension 
5 = Mildly agree with right dimension 
6 = Moderately agree with right dimension 





5. Mentally Healthy Crazy 18. Learning
6. Ha:Q:QY Sad 19. Ho2e
7. Incom2etent Com2etent 20. Useful
8. Feels Good Feels Bad 21. Productive
9. Secure Insecure 22. Peaceful
10. Concrete Abstract 23. Alive
11. Conforming Not Conforming 24. Understanding
12. Changing Static 25. Hel2ing Others 














Death Attitude Profile-Revised 
Wong, Reker, & Gesser (1988) 
Instructions to participants. 
This questionnaire contains a number of statements related to different attitudes toward 
death. Read each statement carefully, and then indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree. For example, an item might read: "Death is a friend." Indicate how well you 
agree or disagree by circling one of the following; (1) strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) 
moderately disagree; (4) Undecided; (5) moderately disagree; (6) agree; and (7) strongly 
agree. It is important that you work through the statements and answer each one. Many 
of the statements will seem alike, but all are necessary to show slight differences in 
attitudes. 
1. Death is no doubt a grim experience. 
2. The prospect of my own death arouses anxiety in me. 
3. I avoid death thoughts at all costs. 
4. I believe that I will be in heaven after I die. 
5. Death will bring an end to all my troubles. „ 
6. Death should be- viewed as natural, undeniable, and unavoidable event. 
7. I am disturbed by the finality of death. 
8. Death is an entrance to a place of ultimate satisfaction. 
9. Death provides an escape from this terrible world. 
10. Whenever the thought of death enters my mind, I try to push it away. 
11. Death is deliverance from pain and suffering. 
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12. I always try not to think about death.
13. I believe that heaven will be a much better place than this world.
14. Death is a natural aspect of life.
15. Death is a union with God and eternal bliss.
/ 
·  
16. Death brings a promise of a new and glorious life.
1 7. I would 11either fear death nor welcome it. 
18.' I liave an intense fear of death. " 
·
19. I avoid thinking about death altogether.
20. The subject of life after death troubles me greatly.
21. The fact that death will mean the end of everything as I know it frightens me.
22. I look forward to a reunion with my loved ones after I die.
23. I view death as a relief from earthly suffering.
24. Death is simply a part of the process of life.
25. I see death as a passage to an eternal and blessed place.
26. I try to have nothing to do with the subject of death.
27. Death offers a wonderful release of the soul.
28. One thing that gives me comfort in facing death is my belief in an afterlife.
29. I' see death as a relief from the burden of this life.
30. Death is neither good nor bad.
31. I look forward to life after death.
32. The uncertainty of not knowing what happens after death worries me�
Scoring for each sub-scale involves computing a mean scale score. 
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Appendix F 
Revised Death Anxiety Scale 
Thorson and Powell (1984) 
Instruction to participants. 
Please rate each of the following statements on a scale from 1 to 5, with statement 1 
provoking the "least anxiety' and 5 the "most anxiety". 
1. I fear dying a painful death. 
2. Not knowing what the next world is like troubles me. 
3. The idea of never thinking again after I die frightens me. 
4. I am not at all anxious about what happens to the body after burial. 
5. Coffins make me anxious. 
6. I hate to think about losing control over my affairs after I am gone. 
7. Being totally immobile after death bothers me. 
8. I dread to think about having an operation. 
9. The subject of life after death troubles me. 
10. I am not afraid of a long, slow dying. 
11. I do not mind the idea of being shut into a coffin when I die. 
12. I hate the idea that I will be helpless after I die. 
13. I am not at all concerned over whether or not there is an afterlife. 
14. Never feeling anything again after die upsets me. 
15. The pain involved in dying frightens me. 
16. I am looking forward to a new life after I die. 
17. I am not worried about being helpless. 
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18. I am troubled by the thought that my body will decompose in the grave. 
19. The feeling that I will be missing out on so much after I die disturbs me. 
20. I am worried about what happens to us after we die. 
21. I am not at all concerned with being in control of things. 
22. The total isolation of death is frightening to me. 
23. I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer. 
24. I will leave careful instructions about how things should be done after I am gone. 
25. What happens to my body after I die does not bother me. 
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Appendix G 
Quality of Life Index 
Spitzer (1980) 
Instructions to participants: 
Each of the next five headings has three choices. Under each heading put a circle around 
the number that best describes your quality of life during the last few weeks. 
Activity — What is your "main" activity? 
1 	I work/study full-time (or nearly so) in my usual occupation or manage my own 
household or take part in as much unpaid or voluntary activity as I wish, whether 
retired or not. 
2 	I work or study in my usual occupation or manage my own household or participate 
in unpaid or voluntary activities; but, I need a lot of help to do so or I work greatly 
reduced hours. 
3 	I do not work in any capacity nor do I study nor do I manage my own household. 
Daily Living — Ability to look after yourself. 
1 	I am able to eat, wash, got o the toilet and dress without assistance. I drive a car or 
use public transport without assistance. 
2 	I can travel and perform daily activities only with assistance (another person or 
special equipment) but can perform light tasks. 
3 	I am confined to my home or an institution and cannot manage personal care or 
light tasks at all. 
Health — What is your state of health? 
1 	I feel well most of the time. 
2 I lack energy or only feel "up to par" some of the time. 
3 	I feel very ill or "lousy" most of the time. 
Support —What support do you receive from others? 
1 	I have a good relationship with others and receive strong support from at least one 
family member and/or friend. 
2 	The support I receive from family and friends is limited. 
3 The support I receive from family and friends occurs infrequently or only when 
absolutely necessary. 
Outlook — How do you feel about your life? 
1 	I am basically a calm person. I generally look forward to things and am able to 
make my own decisions about my life and surroundings. 
2 	I am sometimes troubled and there are times when I do not feel ffilly in control of 
my personal life. I am anxious and depressed at times. 




1. What is your current age? ____ 
2. What is your gender? M 
3. Are you married? Yes No
F 
If yes, for how long? 
4. Do you have any children? Yes No 
5. What is your ethnicity/race?
------
D White / Caucasian D Black / African American D Hispanic / Latino 
D Asian / Pacific Islander · D Other 
-----------
6. What is your religious affiliation, if any?--------------
7. What is your highest level of education?
Some High School 
High School Graduate 
TradeN ocational School 
8. What is your average yearly household income?
< $14,999 -- $35,000-44,999
$15,000-24,999 -- $45,000-54,999
$25,000-34,999 -- $55,000-64,999
9. Are you currently employed? Yes No 
If no, are you a homemaker? Yes No 






If no, do you plan to be employed in the future? Yes No 
10. What is your current physical health status? Excellent Good Fair Poor 
11. Have you been diagnosed with or are suffering from a chronic illness? Yes No
If yes, please list: __ __,_ _______________ _
12. What is you current'menfal h�alth status? Excellent Good Fair 
13. Please rate your current quality:of life in each area listed below:










14. Do you know what advance directives are? For example, Do not Resuscitate orders 
{DNR}, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care {DPAHC}, Living Will/Trust? 
Yes 	No 
If yes, do you have any in place? 
15. Do you have mortuary plans or a will outlining what you what done with your 
remains upon your death? 
16. Have you experienced the loss of a loved one within the last year? Yes 	No 
If yes, what was that person's relation to you? 	  
Appendix I 
May 10, 2000 
Dear (Insert Participant Name) 
You have been selected from Loma Linda University Medical Center (Insert 
which source: Cancer center or Family medicine clinic) to take part in a study of death 
and dying attitudes. Your participation in this study is very important. You will be 
mailed a survey within the next two weeks; however if you do not wish to receive this 
survey, please call our research lab at (909) 558-8165. Participation in this study will not 
affect any medical care you may receive through Loma Linda University Medical Center. 
Professionals caring for individuals dealing with death and dying could better 
serve their patients if they had a better understanding of people's attitudes about death 
and dying. The survey you will receive asks questions about your attitudes on death and 
dying. Some of the questions here are very personal and some may be painful for you to 
answer. The information gathered from these sensitive questions will enable health care 
professionals to better care for anyone facing death. 
The information will be completely anonymous, and you can feel safe in 
participating in this study. No one but the researchers will have access to the information 
you provide. First, you are under no obligation to participate or to continue to participate 
with the survey should you no longer wish to. If there are any particular questions that 
you would like to skip, you may do so. We request that should you choose to stop. or 
decline participation that the survey be returned to us. 
If you have any questions about this study, please do not hesitate to contact 
Rachel Mason at (909) 558-8165, or the project supervisor Dr Kelly Morton at (909) 558-
8721. Additionally, you may contact an impartial third party representative not 
associated with this study at (909) 824-4647. 
Sincerely, 
Rachel A. Mason, M.S. 
Department of Psychology 




November 30, 2000 
Dear (Insert Participant Name), 
About three weeks ago we sent you a survey concerning death attitudes. We have not yet 
heard from you regarding your participation and are wondering what you have decided. 
We know'that this may be a difficult topic for you and want to be sensitive to your 
feelings, but your answers are important to the project. 
Your responses can help professionals caring for individuals dealing with death and 
dying to better serve their patients if they had a better understanding of people's attitudes 
about death and dying. We are writing to you to you again to encourage you to return 
your survey because we feel it is very important that we be able to include your opinions 
and feelings in our study. 
We recognize how busy you must be and greatly appreciate you taking the time to help us 
with this project. If you have already responded, thank you for your help and please 
excuse this letter. If you have not responded, won't you please take a few minutes to do 
so now? If you do not wish to participate please check the decline box on the front of the 
survey and return it in the enclosed envelope. 
Your responses are confidential. If you require additional information or if by chance 
you did not receive the first survey or it has been misplaced and you would like a 
replacement, please call please call Rachel A. Mason, M. S. at (909) 558-8165. Again, 
thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Rachel A. Mason, M. S. 
Department of Psychology 




DAPRFD DAPRDA DAPRNA DAPRAA DAPREA DEATHANX 
N 	Valid 114 117 115 ' 112 112 112 
Missing 7 4 6 9 9 9 
Mean 3.2055 2.8650 5.5913 5.1411 4.3304 59.5625 
Std. Deviation 1.3150 1.3620 .8569 1.4619 1.5076 13.1976 
Skewness .365 1.181 -1.371 -.702 -.198 -.230 
Std. Error of Skewness .226 .224 .226 .228 .228 .228 
Kurtosis -.729 1.007 3.817 -.145 -.766 .622 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .449 .444 .447 .453 .453 .453 
Statistics 
LOC EXCTRL STABILTY PERSCTRL JUSTWRLD SWBRWB SWBEWB 
N 	Valid 102 110 105 109 111 118 116 
Missing 19 11 16 12 10 3 5 
Mean 5.8431 3.3636 2.9143 14.0183 21.7928 0.1864 1.4483 
Std. Deviation 4.9227 5.5168 4.2857 5.6650 5.7763 0.9544 7.1449 
Skewness .443 -.175 .363 .032 -.491 -.305 -.219 
Std. Error of Skewness .239 .230 .236 .231 .229 .223 .225 
Kurtosis -.197 -.429 .269 -.462 -.210 -.978 -1.040 
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Mean = 3.21 
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Canonical Discriminant Function 1 
Symbol Group Label 
1 1 Healthy 
2 2 Spouses of Cancer Sr 
3 3 Cancer Survivors 
* Indicates a group centroid 
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